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Jeffrey Fagan
The contradictions of
juvenile crime & punishment

J

uvenile incarceration in the United
States is, at ½rst glance, distinctly different from its adult counterpart. While
some juvenile facilities retain the iconic
aesthetic of adult incarceration1–orange
jumpsuits, large cellblocks, uniformed
guards, barbed wire, and similar heavysecurity measures–others have trappings
and atmospherics more reminiscent of
boarding schools, therapeutic communities, or small college campuses. These
compact, benign settings avoid the physical stigmata of institutional life and accord some autonomy of movement and
intimacy in relations with staff. They also
give primacy to developmentally appropriate and therapeutic interventions.
However, like its adult counterpart,
juvenile corrections, whether located in
a human warehouse or a therapeutic community, is designed mainly to control its
residents and restrict their personal freedoms. Movement and association are intensively regulated; outside contact with
family, friends, and intimate partners is
attenuated and used as an incentive for
good behavior; access to media and culture is restricted; privacy is nonexistent;
and choice of clothing, language, and
other modes of personal expression is
© 2010 by the American Academy of Arts
& Sciences

off-limits. Whatever developmental importance these forms of self-expression
and self-determination may have for adolescents, it is sacri½ced to the primary
goals of security, control, discipline, and
punishment. Most important, at either
end of the continuum of institutional
climate, the options of solitary con½nement, physical restraint, or other forms of
extreme deprivation exist to control the
de½ant and unruly or to punish wrongdoing. Accordingly, the naming conventions for these juvenile facilities are deceptive: these are not “training schools”
or “centers” or any other kind of school
or academy, nor are they “homes.” These
are correctional facilities whose primary
purpose is to punish.
One would expect such institutions to
be reserved for those who are most deserving of punishment or those who pose
a nontrivial risk to public safety. But under the enduring doctrine of parens patriae,2 we incarcerate children for a mixed
bag of rationales, ones that do not always
comport with the punitive dimensions
of juvenile incarceration. Parens patriae
obligates the court to act beyond the
need simply to protect children from the
harms of noxious social circumstances
or to avail them of developmental and
material supports that their families have
failed to provide. The doctrine allows–
Dædalus Summer 2010
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even mandates–juvenile courts to protect children from themselves: from their
associations with antisocial peers, from
poor decision-making with respect to
crime, and from harms to their physical
and mental health to which they expose
themselves.3 As a result, we incarcerate
children because their homes are too dangerous or criminogenic; because they are
both delinquent and mentally ill or addicted to intoxicants and there are no
other appropriate placements; because
they need therapies that are unavailable
elsewhere, even though they pose no security risks; because they are homeless;
because they are sexually active at young
ages; or because we think they may commit some crime in the near future.4
The resulting landscape of juvenile
incarceration has been, not surprisingly,
complex and shifting since the 1970s, the
decade when adult incarceration trends
began their robust increase. Since that
time, juvenile incarceration, and juvenile
justice itself, has been situated in a space
bounded by the transcendent nineteenthcentury child-saving movement, the procedural rights movement of the 1960s,
and the raw emotional politics of violent
crime and punishment in the past three
decades. Accordingly, we see contradictions everywhere in this terrain. Growth
in the incarcerated population since the
1970s has been restrained, even in the
face of a youth violence epidemic,5 and
even as rhetoric has grown harsher and
statutes have been revised to express the
language of retribution and incapacitation.6 States, for the most part, have acknowledged the advantages of small facilities to advance the core rehabilitative
and therapeutic projects that informed
the creation of separate institutions for
juveniles nearly two centuries ago, even
if they have not necessarily acted on those
ideas and instincts.7 At the same time, the
conditions in juvenile corrections often

remain harsh, a sign of both cynicism
about rehabilitation and institutional
self-interest, as well as neglect.8 States
have quickened the pace of expulsions of
juvenile offenders to the criminal courts
and prisons as a way to “get tough,”9
even as they refuse to lower the age of
majority and fundamentally alter eligibility for the protections of juvenile institutions. Racial disparities remain durable and defy explicit legislative and
policy efforts to reduce them.
These contradictions and puzzles
inform this essay on juvenile incarceration. The patterns of growth in juvenile
corrections suggest ambivalence about
the reform and rehabilitation of juvenile
offenders, notions that have been battered by three successive waves of high
crime over the past thirty years. On the
one hand, courts and legislatures want to
be tough; on the other hand, there are
strong preservationist instincts at play
that have muted the growth in incarceration of minors. “Getting tough” on juvenile offenders has thus been assigned to
the criminal courts and adult correctional
institutions. But there are signs of ambivalence there, with relatively short sentences and a responsiveness to crime rates
in new admissions (flow) and total population (stock) that is the opposite of
what we see for adults. States have demonstrated their ambivalence by avoiding
change to the age of majority, the last resort in increasing punitiveness for juveniles. Such a step would be a poison pill
for the doctrine of parens patriae in which
juvenile corrections is steeped. Racial disparity pervades juvenile incarceration,
yet Congress attempted remedial steps
never contemplated for adults, by engaging states in a collaborative project to reduce racial inequalities in juvenile detention and corrections. What this all adds
up to is an institutional landscape that
at once fears child criminals and wants
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to punish them harshly, but at the same
time adheres to the transcendent philosophy of child-saving.

B

eginning in the 1970s, the traditional
discretion of juvenile court judges to
place youths in correctional con½nement
was contested, as was the discretion of
corrections of½cials to determine how
long youths would remain in placement.
On balance, discretion lost. The introduction of mandatory minimum sentences
for juveniles in New York and elsewhere
in the 1970s was followed in subsequent
decades by new laws mandating waiver
to adult court and mandatory placement
in a secure facility.10 In this hardening
political atmosphere, fueled by rising
juvenile arrest rates and a punitive drift
toward more formal processing and less
diversion, one might have predicted rapid and persistent growth in the rate of juvenile imprisonment starting in the 1970s.
By the 1990s, when a moral panic over a
new species of juvenile offenders known
as “superpredators”11 and the spread of
violent youth gangs further animated legislatures to pass tougher sentencing laws
for juveniles,12 the conditions seemed
ripe for the juvenile court to follow a trajectory of incarceration growth similar
to the rise in adult rates.
But it didn’t happen, at least not in juvenile corrections. Growth in juvenile
incarceration in both public and private
facilities was only a fraction of the growth
in adult incarceration. Juvenile incarceration–both in short-term detention and
longer-term correctional placements–
rose from 73,023 youths in public institutions and private residential facilities in
1977 to 95,818 in 1992, the year preceding
the modern peak in juvenile arrests for
felony crimes.13 Juvenile incarceration
peaked in 2000 at 108,802, a rate of 356
per 100,000 youths ages ten to seventeen.
The placement rate declined by more

than 20 percent by 2008, to approximately 81,000 children living in either stateoperated facilities or privately operated
group homes, or 263 youths per 100,000
persons ages ten to seventeen.14 This
juvenile placement rate today pales in
comparison to the adult incarceration
rate of 762.15
Figure 1 shows that placements in public facilities accounted for most of the
rise and fall in juvenile incarceration, and
that these were somewhat responsive to
the rise and subsequent fall in juvenile
arrests. Between 1997 and 2008, juvenile
arrests declined by 33 percent, while the
overall correctional placement of youths
declined by 26 percent.16 Placement in
private facilities rose more slowly and
was fairly stable over time.
About 70 percent were committed following an adjudication of delinquency,
and 28 percent were detained prior to the
resolution of their case.17 They were incarcerated on a variety of offenses, with
the greatest number placed for person
offenses (34 percent) followed by property offenses (25 percent). Drug offenses
accounted for 9 percent of the incarcerated population, but more were placed
for “public order” offenses such as alcohol or disorderly conduct (11 percent)
than were placed for drugs. As with their
adult counterparts, many (16 percent)
were placed for technical violations of
probation or juvenile parole. One in
twenty was placed for any of several
“status offenses”: social behaviors that
do not violate any criminal code but that
capture the court’s attention due to the
risk of danger to the child’s well-being.18
The area that grew most, however, was
the number of juveniles below age eighteen in state prisons. The pattern in Figure 2 shows a rise in the number of persons below age eighteen incarcerated in
state prisons from 1985 to 2004, as well
as new admissions for that same group.
Dædalus Summer 2010
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Figure 1
Juvenile Placements in Public and Private Facilities and Juvenile Arrests for Violence, 1977–2006

Source: Melissa Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (National Center
for Juvenile Justice, 2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp; Steven D. Levitt, “Juvenile Crime and
Punishment,” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 1156–1185.

The patterns reflect broader trends in
juvenile crime and arrest, especially the
spike in juvenile violence from 1987 to
1996. The census population of minors in
prison peaked at 5,400 in 1996 and declined by nearly half, to 2,477, in 2004.19
The population remained stable through
2007, when 2,283 youths were in state
prisons or privately operated correctional
facilities programmed for adults.20
Two trends in Figure 2 are notable and
suggest conflicting instincts.
One is the rapid growth in the number of youths sentenced as adults. This
trend is responsive to crime trends and
also reflects a growing punitiveness toward youth crime that was structured
into sentencing statutes. (The “get tough”
trend for juveniles is discussed later in
this essay.) But the sentences seem to be
attenuated, suggesting that the legislatures were tempered in setting tariffs for
minors. Figure 2 shows that the number
of new admissions of minors to adult
46
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prisons tracks the trend for the one-day
census. There is no buildup of “stock”
for this population, unlike the steady
growth for adults.
The similar trend lines for the population census and the new admissions suggest that the sentences for this population
were shorter and releases were quicker,
reflecting a de facto youth discount that
many states structure into sentencing
statutes under “youthful offender” or
“juvenile offender” provisions.21 The responsiveness in the decline of juveniles
in adult prisons beginning in 2000 shows
a sensitivity to declining crime rates that
is not evident for the adult population.
Nevertheless, even short-term exposure for youths to adult prisons has risks
for youths and for public safety. To the
extent that legislators ignored these risks,
the wholesale transfer of minors to the
criminal courts was a reckless experiment.
A robust body of research shows that recidivism rates are in fact higher for youths

Figure 2
Inmates under Eighteen in State Prisons, 1985–2004
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Source: Howard Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), 236–238,
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006.

sentenced as adults, after controlling for
relevant offender and offense characteristics.22 There appears to be no marginal
deterrent effect from incarcerating minors as adults, which was a cornerstone
of youth policy in the 1990s. One explanation for the elevated recidivism rates may
be the effects of adolescents’ exposure to
prison life and adult convicts. While likely to be separated physically from older
inmates, the institutional climate on the
youth side may hardly differ from other
blocks in the prison: the separation may
be one of degree rather than kind. Indeed,
it may even worsen the chaos and violence of correctional con½nement by concentrating youths who are at their peak
ages of criminality and diminished selfcontrol.23 Only a few studies have compared the correctional experiences of
youths in prisons and juvenile incarceration, but all agree that placing youths in
prisons comes at a cost: they are less like-

ly to receive education and other essential
services, they are more likely to be victims of physical violence, and they manifest a variety of psychological symptoms.24
The residual consequences of adolescents’ exposure to violence in adult prisons are uncertain. But as a matter of principle, it is not easy to reconcile this particular harm with the diminished blameworthiness and culpability of adolescents.
Social and behavioral science informed
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on
youth crime and punishment,25 but criminal court sentencing policies more generally are hostile to the new cognitive
science of diminished culpability of adolescents.26 Potentially dis½guring punishments seem disproportionate, if not
cynical, in the context of this new evidence about the blameworthiness of adolescents, especially if criminal justice
goals are not well served by transfer and
subsequent incarceration.27
Dædalus Summer 2010
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There are puzzles and contradictions

behind these trends. While American
lawmakers exponentially expanded prison capacities for adults starting in the
1980s, there was–with rare exceptions–
no expansion of the capacities to incarcerate minors. This was one of two nonevents in modern juvenile justice that illustrate the dissonance in thinking about
responses to serious youth crime. Figure 1
shows that the rate of increase in juvenile
con½nement was a fraction of the rate of
increase in juvenile arrests; as crime declined, juvenile courts responded quickly by decelerating the rate of placements.
Yet in the juvenile system, even as
states made the choice not to build new
juvenile space and not to dramatically
increase youth con½nement, every state
toughened its juvenile delinquency codes
rhetorically to deemphasize rehabilitation and focus on punishment, retribution, and incapacitation.28 Thus, “getting tough” in the juvenile system was
not an institutional project, but a statutory one. Programming was largely unaffected, as the locus of effects of these
new measures was on court decisions.
The changes took several forms, but all
had the combined effect of marginally
increasing the likelihood of juvenile correctional con½nement or lengthening the
time spent in placement.
The harder work of “getting tough”
was outsourced to the criminal justice
system, with states more often than not
using “regular” criminal law for juveniles.
Statutes were amended to ease and expand the number of youths transferred
to the criminal courts for sentencing as
an adult.29 The results are evident in
Figure 2, as the number of youths con½ned in adult prisons rose (and fell)
sharply. The “get tough” measures took
several forms. Between 1990 and 1997,
every state in America modi½ed both
its juvenile and criminal codes to expand
Dædalus Summer 2010

the number of youths eligible for transfer
to the criminal courts.30 In 1995 alone,
nineteen states amended their criminal
codes to facilitate the discretionary transfer of delinquents to the criminal court or
the wholesale exclusion of youths from
the juvenile court.31 Each strategy was
designed to increase punishment in numbers and in severity. Several states adopted mandatory minimum sentences for
youths committed to state juvenile corrections authorities. Others adopted sentencing guidelines that ½xed sentences
in the juvenile system based on a grid of
offense, offender characteristics, and victim characteristics. Still other states expanded eligibility for sentencing minors
to life without parole, or death in prison,
and made those sentences automatic upon conviction for enumerated crimes.32
Prior to the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Graham v. Florida that banned lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles
who did not commit murder,33 approximately 2,484 youths were serving such
sentences in 2008, many as young as
thirteen, and many others for crimes
other than murder or manslaughter.34
But these developments point to the
second non-event in the toughening of
juvenile justice and juvenile incarceration. Certainly, a state that truly wanted
to crack down on juveniles and make incarceration harsher could simply have
lowered its age of majority and sent all
its older juvenile offenders to adult prisons. Only two did so: Wisconsin and
New Hampshire lowered the age of majority from seventeen to sixteen in the
1990s.35 In fact, one state, Connecticut,
has begun a process to incrementally
raise its age of majority from sixteen to
eighteen.36 New York and North Carolina
maintain the age of majority at sixteen; in
most states, it is still eighteen.
Stopping short of the more obvious
and expedient step of lowering the age

of majority, states have instead used an
incremental and piecemeal legislative
strategy to criminalize delinquency and
thereby allow them to sentence adolescents to adult punishment for crimes
committed as minors. But despite the
wave of transfer legislation, the current
statutory landscape is an elaborate game
of chutes and ladders, with some youths
automatically transferred to the criminal
courts only to be “reverse waived” back
to the juvenile courts. As a result, many
adolescent offenders (though no one
knows exactly how many) escape the
reach of the criminal law and its harsher punishments. Nevertheless, a large
number are removed from the juvenile
to the criminal courts by statutory exclusion, judicial discretion, or the administrative practices and preferences of prosecutors.37
Viewed in this way, legislators appear
ambivalent, refusing to abandon completely the principles of juvenile justice,
yet seeking to divide delinquents into two
categories: those worthy of the remedial
and therapeutic interventions of the juvenile court and those who should be abandoned to the punitive regime of criminal
justice in the name of retribution and
public safety. The complexity of state
laws, the piecemeal character of the statutory landscape, and the fact that most
states have overlapping transfer mechanisms suggest a philosophical duality.
The punitive and child-saver instincts
for youth crime coexist uneasily in the
current statutory environment, forcing
a binary choice between criminal and
juvenile court jurisdiction–a choice
that is not well suited to reconcile these
tensions.38
On balance, the business of getting
tough on juvenile offenders was assigned
to the criminal justice system, while the
juvenile system remained relatively small
and still wrapped, however thinly, in its

rehabilitative and child-saver clothing.
Why did juvenile corrections expand so
little during a time of unprecedented and
unrestrained growth in adult corrections?
And why did it transform from warehousing to embracing smaller, more therapeutically grounded facilities?39 The numbers reveal the tension between two features of American jurisprudence surrounding juvenile offenders. We believe
deeply in child-saving, yet we are quick
to expose violent children to the harshest
punishments in service to the same punitive instincts that drive mass incarceration of adults. But even there, we pull
our punches. We pull back from the brink
of fully embracing punitiveness toward
juveniles, reserving it instead for adults.
Not only is the philosophy of child-saving
an important normative modi½er of these
instincts, it is also deeply embedded in
the institutions of juvenile justice and
juvenile corrections.
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One episode illustrates the connections

between the visceral push for punitiveness and political culture. In 1996, former
U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett and two colleagues published Body
Count.40 The book offered a “moral poverty” theory of youth crime, rejecting
social theories of juvenile crime causation that focused on economic poverty,
discrimination, family dysfunction, or
savage levels of inequality. Instead, for
Bennett and his coauthors, it was moral
poverty that characterized a coming wave
of “superpredators” who would commit
extremely violent crimes and be immune
to rehabilitative interventions. They characterized this new breed of young offenders as impulsive and remorseless, fearing
not “the stigma of arrest, the pains of imprisonment, [or] the pangs of conscience.”
These (predicted) young criminals were
portrayed nearly as a separate species.
The authors’ predictions were based on
Dædalus Summer 2010
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data that were compiled through 1993,
the peak year of juvenile crime and violence in the United States.41 Their predictions turned out to be horribly wrong.42
But the damage was done. The book
supplied strong and scary rhetoric to fuel
the legislative panic that, in general, produced a wave of get-tough legislation
across the country. So strong and persuasive was this rhetoric that it led one state
(Pennsylvania) to build a youth prison
in anticipation of a surge of superpredators, not a juvenile center that emphasized rehabilitation and other services.
The State Correctional Institute at Pine
Grove opened in 2000, its plan and design based on population projections
from the superpredator era and with
that pro½le of the young offender in
mind. At its opening, the prison housed
178 young offenders, well below its capacity of 1,000.43 By that time, youth
crime had fallen in Pennsylvania, and
the number of youths below eighteen
in adult prisons had fallen to sixty-six.
To ½ll this new youth prison, the state
moved young offenders from some traditional correctional settings to Pine Grove,
and the state’s juvenile court judges made
good use of the new placement option.
Pine Grove today is well occupied, housing approximately one thousand inmates
below the age of twenty-one. Built to
house the expected wave of superpredators, today it is ½lled with a heterogeneous
group of adolescent offenders whose pro½les are more typical of the variety of
youth crimes that characterize contemporary youth dockets.

The character of juvenile incarceration

has also changed dramatically over three
decades. Beginning in the 1970s, as adult
correctional populations surged, large
juvenile corrections facilities in several
states were replaced by smaller facilities
housing fewer than thirty children per

50
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center, sometimes in community-based
residential programs but other times in
“campuses” that included cluster or residential “pods.”44 Jerome Miller, architect
of the Massachusetts reforms, showed
that scandals involving staff abuse of
youth residents, as well as youth suicides
and uncontrolled violence, often sparked
these changes. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Florida, among others,
moved from large, toxic warehouses to
these smaller, disaggregated dormitorylike units.45 In effect, the capacities of
these systems were capped, and any expansion required the participation of
the private sector.46
Yet noxious conditions still prevail in
many juvenile corrections facilities and
systems, and litigation is not uncommon.
In Galloway v. Texas,47 for example, plaintiff Galloway was placed in detention at
fourteen and held until he reached nineteen, the maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction, based on unreviewable administrative decisions by facility staff. The trial
record showed that Galloway and many
others had been physically and sexually
abused, subjected to physical punishment, abused by other inmates (abuse
that was often sanctioned by staff ), and
denied access to counsel. Essential services–medical care, education, psychiatric treatment–were found to be substandard. More than ½ve hundred children were released from unlawful juvenile corrections con½nement in Texas
as a result of the ruling.
Conditions in New York State juvenile
corrections facilities were investigated
recently by the Civil Rights Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice, which
reported similar problems.48 And in
California, the state was ordered back to
court for failure to comply with the terms
of a consent decree that committed the
juvenile corrections authority, the Division of Juvenile Justice of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (formerly the Youth Authority), to
conform to professional and legal standards for essential services and the safety
of its wards.49 These cases are not isolated instances; litigation to remedy violent,
abusive, and other substandard conditions in juvenile incarceration and detention has been repeated across the country
for decades.
Structurally, federal civil rights litigation in these instances is constrained in
its force and reach by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (plra).50 In Galloway,
for instance, relief was limited by the
plra’s constraints on which conditions
can be litigated, its short paths to termination of existing remedial decrees, and
its restrictions on the authority of federal judges to order future remedies. The
plra applies fully to juvenile corrections
and detention facilities: Congress classi½ed juvenile facilities as “prisons” and
their occupants “prisoners.” In doing so,
it erected tall and robust barriers to children’s assertion of their rights: in effect,
they face the same hurdles that adult
prisoners do. For children, the problem
is compounded because they cannot sue
in their own name, and also by the fact
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17
relegates the question of capacity and
overcrowding to state law. Under these
conditions, children cannot get to court
without a guardian, and most lack the
social capital and experience to activate
those resources. Furthermore, there simply are no local enforcement mechanisms
to ensure compliance with federal litigation. It is up to local district attorneys to
enforce the law when abuses are revealed.
The political complications are obvious.
Again, we see very different visions of
juvenile justice and incarceration. One is
represented by the development of new
models and institutional designs for the
rehabilitation of serious juvenile offend-

ers. This vision includes attention not
just to basics such as education, but to
new models for working with children
and their families to sustain therapeutic
successes beyond the time of correctional con½nement.51 The other vision is
typi½ed by institutions that are violent,
abusive, and indifferent to the essential
developmental interventions for adolescent offenders. Attorney and legal scholar Michael Tigar characterizes these as
places where juvenile punishment has
taken on the distorted values of criminal
law and correctional institutions, where
intervention is secondary to security and
punishment, and where indifference tolerates abuse and violence.52 In these
places, services are thin and differ little
from ordinary jails, only that the residents are younger, smaller, and more easily exploited. Between these poles are the
institutions that struggle to mount effective programs with a population of dif½cult children who pose security as well
as therapeutic challenges.
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acial disparities in juvenile detention
and incarceration closely resemble racial
disparities in the imprisonment and jailing of adults. Considering the negative
consequences of incarceration on crime
and social well-being, these disparities
unfortunately may multiply the effects
of other forms of disadvantage and may
become an endogenous form of inequality that is dif½cult to escape. Social scientists call this a “poverty trap.”53
In the 2006 census of juveniles in residential placement, 40.2 percent of residents were African American and 20.5
percent were Hispanic, compared to 35
percent white.54 These disparities were
greater for person crimes and drug offenses (44 percent were African American in each category) and less for technical violations (37 percent were African
American) and status offenses (33 perDædalus Summer 2010
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cent were African American). In fact, 50
percent of incarcerated status offenders
counted in the 2006 juvenile corrections
census were white.
Racial disparities are far worse for pretrial detention, compared to those who
are incarcerated following a ½nding of
delinquency. Nearly half (48 percent) of
those detained for person crimes, 45 percent detained on drug offenses, and 46
percent detained for public order offenses
were African Americans, compared to
less than 30 percent whites in each of
these categories.55 (Public order offenses
include weapons offenses as well as public drinking and a range of low level–and
high police-discretion–misdemeanor offenses.)
These disparities are not well explained
by differences in crime rates.56 Studies
using several designs and analytic strategies conclude that racial disparities in the
decision to detain and incarcerate youths
are influenced by race and risk factors
such as family structure that are correlated
with race more than criminal behavior.57
Other research implicates fundamental
cognitive and unconscious processes in
the production of disparities. Two studies based on observations of decisions by
police or probation of½cers illustrate the
role of race in the attribution of blameworthiness, risk of future crime, and recommendations for punishment. Sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen, analyzing narratives of presentence reports
by probation of½cers in three counties in
Washington State, showed that probation
of½cers were more likely to attribute the
causes of crime for African American
youths to internal character and personality attributes rather than external factors such as family, neighborhood, or
school. These internal attributions led
to conclusions about “responsibility,”
whereas external attributions tended to
reduce culpability by externalizing the orDædalus Summer 2010

igins of crime (and its severity) for white
youths to the defendant’s social surroundings. These internal attributions in turn
led to racially disparate attributions of
risk of future offending and harsher sentencing recommendations. Bridges and
Steen also noted that a criminal history
tends to multiply these effects.
Educational psychologist Sandra
Graham and organizational behavior
scholar Brian Lowery produced similar
results using an experimental paradigm
in which police and probation of½cers
made judgments about culpability and
predictions of future crime following
exposure to race-speci½c or race-neutral
subliminal primes. Compared to of½cers
given a race-neutral prime, police and
probation of½cers given race-speci½c
primes rated a hypothetical offender
with more negative traits such as hostility and immaturity, attributed greater
culpability, had higher expectations of
recidivism, and endorsed harsher punishment. These results were robust to
controls for consciously expressed beliefs about African Americans.
Studies based on case-processing data
also reach the same conclusions, as does
a research summary prepared for the Department of Justice. This is true both in
criminal court and for juveniles who are
transferred to criminal court.58
The policy studies raise two dif½cult
questions. First, are the effects of disparate outcomes at early stages predictive
of outcomes–including the decision to
detain or incarcerate a young offender–
at later stages? Researchers disagree on
this point. Some suggest that disadvantage at early decision points, such as the
decision to detain or to treat a case formally instead of using a diversionary alternative, at a minimum carries forward
and perhaps multiplies across decision
points. Others suggest that disparities at
each stage are unique to decisions at that

stage, net of ½ltering at each stage. In either case, there is a unique additive component for race that seems to produce
disparate outcomes overall, including
correctional placements.59
Second, and more fundamentally, does
the combined evidence from experimental and observational studies suggest that
racial bias is present in the juvenile justice
system with suf½cient salience to produce
disparities? It is always dif½cult to identify and control for all the counterfactuals
that would have to be defeated in order
to make such a claim. At the least, these
would include a set of institutional preferences and norms that are dif½cult to
measure and that are likely to vary widely
across locales. But what is important to
note is that the two most likely counterfactuals–differences in criminal behavior and differences in social risk indicia
–are not signi½cant producers of racial
disparities.
Based on the research of Graham and
Lowery, conscious bias is not a signi½cant
producer of racial disparity either, but
subconscious bias may be, as well as racial differences in punitiveness and racial
stereotypes. Sociologist Lawrence Bobo
and Victor Thompson, for example, summarize public opinion research to show
that negative racial stereotypes, antiblack
affect, and collective racial resentments
translate into increased punitiveness.60
We have no reason to believe that this
might not apply to probation workers
and police of½cers who produce a supply
of cases for the juvenile court. Research
on “colorism” shows that both African
Americans and white Americans associate skin tone with criminality and deserved punishment.61 In a series of tests
on implicit bias, every population group
except African Americans unconsciously
associates “African American” with crime
or danger and reacts accordingly.62 Tests
include recognition of African American

faces in crime situations (including possession of weapons)63 and whether to
shoot unarmed suspects when they are
shown holding ambiguous objects other
than guns.64 Con½rming what Bridges
and Steen and Graham and Lowery reported, the Plant and Peruche tests given to police of½cers produced the same
results.
The impacts of racially disparate decisions in juvenile detention and incarceration go beyond the loss of liberty and
exposure to socially and emotionally dis½guring punishments. Juvenile incarceration attenuates the accumulation of social capital to access job networks and
other supports; instead–at a developmentally sensitive and strategic period
of transition from adolescence to adulthood–it leads to the accrual of criminal
capital that sustains delinquency beyond
the time of placement.65 In this way, incarceration compounds social and racial
disadvantage to sustain inequalities over
the life course,66 with crime itself only a
partial explanation of the sources of that
disadvantage. For minors, developmental trajectories following incarceration
suggest that crime is less a factor than
cascading social disadvantage. Studies
of criminality over the life course show
the unique and lasting disadvantage that
accrues from an early incarceration experience, no matter the behavior that led
to the period of incarceration.67 Incarceration at a young age not only increases
the risk of future incarceration, it mortgages the long-term prospects of young
males for marriage, employment, and
social stability over a lifetime. Even a
short spell in detention adversely influences the outcomes of cases once they get
to court, tipping the odds toward harsher punishment instead of diversion or
probation.68 Young offenders who are
detained in jails or group homes while
their cases work their way through court
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are more likely to be placed in a correctional institution at the conclusion of the
case than those who return home or to
school as their cases are resolved. Early
correctional placement has a multiplier
effect on the prospects of future imprisonment. To the extent that incarceration effects carry forward, we might ask
whether the social harms of incarceration on young people are simply those
of their parents revisited on them–and
whether the harms to them will be revisited on their children.69

In the political economy of incarcera-

tion, it is remarkable that either a legislative or executive branch would acknowledge racial disparity much less seek remedies to it. Thus, the efforts of the Department of Justice and Congress to reduce
racial disparities in juvenile con½nement
through public interventions are courageous and noteworthy. Because this step
was reserved for minors, it again signals
the special place child-saving holds as a
normative imperative and policy preference in the culture of crime and punishment.
To regulate public sector practices that
might lead to racial disparities, Congress
took a rare step in 1992, passing legislation requiring states that receive federal juvenile-justice funds to implement
strategies to reduce disparities (where
those disparities exist) in the con½nement rates of minority juveniles. This
provision, known as the disproportionate minority contact statute (dmc),70
seems modest in comparison to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act: it applies
only to state-run juvenile justice programs receiving federal funds. Failure
to comply can cost an agency at least 25
percent of its federal juvenile-justice
support.
Legal scholar Olatunde Johnson71 describes the dmc provision as unique in
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several ways. First, it calls on public actors to reduce disparities no matter what
the cause, no matter whether intentional
or reflective of the types of passive discrimination that characterize everyday
institutional business, even if these practices advance the criminal justice interests of the public agency. Action requires
only that there be a showing that the agency was complicit in producing disparity.
Second, the statute requires states to
gather analytic data to diagnose the institutional practices or public policies that
produce racial disparities, and to identify
appropriate steps to change those practices. In effect, the statute requires states
to look beyond “invidious bias” to discover and remedy the sources of disparity.
States were tasked with submitting intervention plans that reflected their analysis
of the sources of disparity, developing interventions, and assessing the success of
their efforts. In 2002, Congress broadened
the mandate of dmc to look not just at
con½nement, but also at any type of contact. This expansion recognized the role
that police and early-stage juvenile justice
decisions play in producing disparities.
There are stories of both success and
failure under dmc. Johnson notes that
when dmc succeeds, it is because it leveraged the power of internal and external
local advocates to design measures to reduce disparity. The data analytic component has also produced informational
transparency that levels the playing ½eld
between advocates and government of½cials. It is a process of what legal scholar
Heather Gerken calls “federalism all the
way down,” in part localizing solutions
and also developing local expertise that
competes with interior institutional logic and norms.72
Johnson suggests that failures under
dmc reflect the weakness of local enforcement and ambivalence, if not resistance, that are, in turn, reflections of the

local political structure. It requires internal change agents within agencies as well
as external agents, especially advocacy
groups. Localities could be exposed to
lawsuits based on the information developed through the data analytic process,
creating an untenable political tension. A
set of political scripts that invokes public
safety concerns in the face of systemic reform efforts is a blunt instrument to neutralize reform.73 Thus, the recurring renewal of political support–based on research–is essential to sustain the reform.
And this, as Johnson points out, is hardly
a sure bet, since radically disparate treatment is not a strong motivation to expend
political capital. The counterargument is
that revelations of the connection between public policy and racially disparate
treatment leading to incarceration make
a strong normative argument that political actors ignore at their own risk. Perhaps the current low-crime era affords a
moment to push ahead with this project.

The opposing, if not contradictory,

trends in the philosophy and practice of
juvenile incarceration can be observed
empirically in states’ variations in the
practice and reach of juvenile incarceration. At the peak of juvenile incarceration,
states varied in their incarceration populations from a low of 70 per 100,000 juveniles in Vermont to a high of 583 in
Louisiana.74 Explanations for variation
are themselves varied: from racial threat
and symbolic threats to public order, to
violent crime rates, to loose couplings
between juvenile and adult correctional
systems, to variation in the political traction of “get tough” policies.75 These diverse explanations matter because they
speak to different strains in the political
culture of crime and punishment–in
particular about whether juvenile crime
and punishment is itself a symbolic or
substantive concern.

Symbolic threats are sociologically
connected to structural conditions, including minority threat, inequality, and
public manifestations of crime such as
gangs. When professor of law Jonathan
Simon speaks about “governing through
crime,” he portrays a discourse and subsequent political mobilization built on
crime fears that translate into legislative
action. These threats create emotions
beyond the facts of crime itself by imparting social meaning to crime: gang
violence signals the rise of an enemy, for
example, and the trifecta of gangs, guns,
and drugs signals a very particular and urgent threat to social order. Even property
crime can translate into a threat through
its spurious connection to violent crime.
If crime itself is racially skewed, whether
among juveniles or adults, then disconnecting symbolic threats from the real
fears of crime becomes more dif½cult.
Sorting out these threats is a dif½cult
empirical task. An analysis by criminologist Daniel Mears of state variation in
juvenile incarceration suggests that it is
not just the threat of violent crime that
explains differences between states, but
a combination of adult crime rates, adult
incarceration rates, and juvenile property
crime rates. What happened to the superpredator discourse about juvenile violence? Why was it not a more powerful
predictor of juvenile incarceration?
Quite likely, the discourse was already
incorporated into other “get tough”
measures, including adult incarceration
rates and policies, as well as adult crime.
State variation may also conceal internal systemic and political factors that
bear on institutional capacities. Consider the stories told earlier about Texas,
California, and Pennsylvania (and add
New York to the analysis). Texas made
no changes in capacity in the face of litigation and a consent decree. California’s
Youth Authority reduced its capacity from
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ten thousand a decade ago to less than
two thousand today in response to litigation. Pennsylvania built a juvenile prison
that now houses nearly one thousand
young offenders, but New York State is
attempting to close several of its juvenile
incarceration facilities, and may yet do so
if the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department proceeds from its investigation to pursue litigation. However, New
York’s efforts to downsize its system have
been neutralized by the structure of union
contracts and political constraints from
local legislators fearing adverse economic
impacts from the closing of institutions.
There are 241 empty beds out of about
300 in the six nonsecure residential facilities targeted for closing, and 254 state employees will lose their jobs if the closings
proceed.76 The math suggests part of the
reason why closing is so hard to achieve.

The number of minors locked up across

the nation is a small fraction of the adolescents under the supervision of the juvenile
and criminal justice systems, but it casts a
long shadow over the principles and practice of juvenile and criminal justice. Separate institutions for juveniles, and later
a separate court, served the twin goals of
protecting adolescent offenders from the
stigma and brutality of criminal justice
and intervening in their lives to remedy
the conditions that animated their antisocial behavior. Yet the punitive turn in juvenile justice increased the use of incarceration by juvenile courts and the expulsion
of juvenile offenders to adult jails and prisons.77 Not only are both forms of juvenile
incarceration plagued by unconstitutionally cruel conditions and institutional neglect, but the emphasis on punitiveness,
including the exile of juveniles to the criminal justice system, before adolescent development may do more harm than good.
Three facts suggest that the punitive
turn in juvenile corrections is neither a
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socially productive nor a principled path.
First, new behavioral and biological research about maturity and criminal culpability, largely focused on emotional
regulation, impulsivity, decision-making,
and other behavioral functioning closely linked to brain development and the
social psychological skills that it controls, suggests that children remain immature and therefore less culpable well
into late adolescence.78 Second, adolescents who are tried and punished as
adults are rearrested and incarcerated
more often, more quickly, and for more
serious crimes.79 They are more likely
to suffer mental health problems, including traumatic stress reactions, and
are less likely to receive effective services to overcome their developmental
or other behavioral de½cits. And third,
lengthened sentences for juvenile offenders, whether in juvenile or adult
corrections placements, are of no apparent consequence to public safety.80
These facts argue for a return to the ½rst
principles of juvenile justice: avoiding
harm and stigma and building the social
capital and human capacity of the child.
Declining crime rates, the pervasiveness
of racial disparities in detention and incarceration, the intellectual and political
exhaustion of the “toughness” paradigm
in juvenile justice, and new gains in the
science of adolescent development have
converged to create an opportunity for
principled reform. More careful regulation and deliberation of the use of incarceration can lay the foundation for more
effective and fair policies. While the law
has moved toward increasing the incarceration of younger teens, social and biological evidence suggests moving in the
other direction. Perhaps it is time for the
law to change course and follow the science and the principles it evokes.
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